See Part I
The title of Ivan Nechepurenko’s May 16 article “Ukraine’s Eurovision Win Rouses a Chorus of Anger and Suspicion in Russia”, severely deemphasizes the otherwise clearly corrupt Eurovision judging as detailed in Phil Butler’s May 18 Russia Insider piece “Big Brother: Your Eurovision 2016 Judge, Jury, and Executioner”. Nechepurenko writes: “Certainly, her song was interpreted by many as an oblique comment on the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014, not to speak of most ethnic Ukrainians and Tatars general distaste for anything and everything Russian.”
A number of facts suggest that view isn’t so great as some suggest. They include the:
– Ukrainians voting very favorably for the Russian Eurovision contestant
– polling that shows most ethnic Ukrainians in Crimea supporting that area’s reunification with Russia
– a town in Kiev regime controlled Ukraine, which prefers that town’s pre-Soviet name Yelisavetgrad honoring a Russian Empire era princess, over its Soviet period name and the one preferred by anti-Russian leaning Ukrainian nationalists
– the numerous ethnic Ukrainians involved with the pro-Russian Donbass rebels
Russian continuing to be the preferred language for many ethnic Ukrainians, regardless of how they view Russia
– the continued high profile presence of the Moscow Patriarchate affiliated Ukrainian Orthodox Church
– indications that a noticeable number of Tatars are okay with Crimea’s reunification with Russia.
Nechepurenko’s stated “general distaste for anything and everything Russian”, didn’t prevent Ukraine’s 2016 Eurovision contestant from appearing in Sochi in 2015. Her parents remain in Crimea.
Christina Paschyn’s May 19 op-ed “Russia is Trying to Wipe Out Crimea’s Tatars”, is the exact opposite of a relatively objective fact based political history. The article’s title is factually contradicted by post-Soviet Russia’s acknowledgement of the Soviet WW II era collective wrong done to the Crimean Tatars and Crimean Tatar being one of three official languages recognized in Crimea (along with Russian and Ukrainian), since Crimea’s reunification with Russia.
(In response to this observation, some anti-Russian propagandists have noted that Russian remains the most commonly spoken of the three main languages in Crimea. What they’re reluctant to add is that Russian is by choice, the most popular language in Crimea, thereby making it disrespectful to advocate a restriction of that language. Try getting the English speaking majority in Saskatchewan and most of the rest of Canada to change their linguistic preference to French.)
Paschyn’s cherry picked historical accounting omits the slave trade perpetuated by the Crimean Tatar Khanate against Slavs and others. She erroneously suggests that the Crimean Tatars predominated in Crimea before the Rus era Slavs (the descendants of modern day Russians, Ukrainians and Belarusians). The Russian Empire’s takeover of Crimea was partly motivated by the persistent threat posed by the Turkish aligned Crimean Tatar Khanate. Within reason, the Russian Empire can be seen as the historical/cultural successor to Rus, prior to its getting subjugated by the Mongols.
Paschyn joins Nechepurneko in ignoring the valid reasons for believing the 2016 Eurovision to be a politically motivated farce. Jamala’s first place song “1944”, concerns an action that happened as WW II was drawing to a close. The May 10 Vineyard Saker blog post “Tell Eurovision in 1944 Stalin Deported Crimean Tatars to protect Them From Punishment for Nazi War Crimes”, offers a counter to Paschyn’s slant. I don’t agree with everything said in that Vineyard Saker post. IMO, its valid points are clouded by some faultily inappropriate comments.
As that blog piece notes, there’s a reasoned basis to believe that a disproportionate number of Crimean Tatars had collaborated with the Nazis, who treated that community better than others in Crimea. Stalin was no angel. at the same time, he didn’t want to risk a civil war in his country as WW II was still being fought. Hence, the collective deportation of the Crimean Tatars to Soviet Central Asia – an act that arguably prevented a settling of scores. The dire wartime conditions in the USSR and brutish manner of Stalin, best explain the horrid circumstances that led to many Crimean Tatar deaths during their deportation experience.
Post-Soviet Russia has condemned the collective WW II era deportation of the Crimean Tatars, while committing itself to a multi-lingual/multi-cultural Crimea. This compares better to Turkey’s treatment of the Armenian Genocide (a more gruesome act than what the Crimean Tatars experienced) and the Kiev regime’s attitude towards Stepan Bandera and his supporters.
Paschyn’s referenced claim that Stalin had designs on Turkey appear far-fetched. His troop movements indicated that he had other priorities. For whatever one negatively thinks of Stalin, he did leave Austria as promised and didn’t actively support the Greek Communists (at the end of WW II), in line with his understanding with the West. As WW II was drawing to a close, Turkey wasn’t in the cards for any noteworthy Soviet influence.
Paschyn mentions the Crimean Tatar activist Mustafa Dzhemilev. No mention is made of his opposition to recognizing the Armenian Genocide and his ethnic cleansing call for having the Russians leave Crimea altogether. Dzhemilev getting banned from entering Crimea is part of a tit for tat process that sees a travel ban against some Russian citizens by Kiev regime controlled Ukraine and the EU.
Given the nature of the Kiev regime, I can disagreeably understand its seeking to exhibit extreme political restrictions. On the other hand, the EU conjures up a more tolerant image. The EU’s non-travel ban on Dzhemilev and travel ban on Iosif Kobzon, is indicative of a politically correct fascism.
Since reunifying with Russia, the Crimean area hasn’t had the degree of politically motivated killings evident in Kiev regime controlled Ukraine. There’re indications that the minority Tatar community in Crimea have (as previously noted) a noticeable element who’ve accepted the desire of the region’s pro-Russian majority.
Maxim Trudolyubov is the kind of quintessential Russian “liberal”, who triggers different reactions. His partisan views against Russia find space in Western mass media outlets like The NYT. A case in point being his May 26 op-ed “The Sore Losers of Russia”, which is rebuked in a May 27 Proposition 1 blog post “How Maxim Trudolyubov Lets Ideology Trump Facts”.
Trudolyubov’s NYT commentary makes reference to the doping scandal involving Russian athletics (track & field) – something which I commented on this past January 24. As of this writing, a decision is due out soon, on whether Russia’s athletics’ team will be allowed to compete in the upcoming Summer Olympics.
On that subject, The NYT has made clear its preference by regularly featuring articles along the lines of Travis Tygart’s May 25 op-ed “Come Clean Russia, or No Rio”. Tygart takes the position of a flawed moral supremacist and ethnic profiler. To date, there’s no beyond a reasonable doubt evidence that all, or most of Russia’s track and field Olympians are either drug cheats, or greater violators than what exists elsewhere. Moreover, Russian sports officialdom have acknowledged the doping problem (in their country) under sanctioned review and have put forth an effort to improve the monitoring process. It therefore appears discriminatory for Tygart to brazenly support an Olympic ban on the Russian athletics’ team.
Tygart's uncompassionate stance ignores what legendary Russian pole vaulter Yelena Isinbayeva and some others have said. As is true with many other Russian Olympians, Tygart has no proof of wrongdoing on the part of Isinbayeva and Russia's athletics' coach, Yuriy Borzakovskiy, who competed in the 800 meters in four Summer Olympics, inclusive of his 2004 gold medal victory.